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The Motion of Intellect On the Neoplatonic 
Reading of Sophist 248e-249d
Eric D. Perl
Loyola Marymount University, Department of Philosophy
1 LMU Drive, Suite 3600, Los Angeles, CA 90045
eperl@lmu.edu
Abstract
This paper defends Plotinus’ reading of Sophist 248e-249d as an expression of the 
togetherness or unity-in-duality of intellect and intelligible being. Throughout the dia-
logues Plato consistently presents knowledge as a togetherness of knower and known, 
expressing this through the myth of recollection and through metaphors of grasping, 
eating, and sexual union. He indicates that an intelligible paradigm is in the thought 
that apprehends it, and regularly regards the forms not as extrinsic “objects” but as the 
contents of living intelligence. A meticulous reading of Sophist 248e-249d shows that 
the “motion” attributed to intelligible being is not temporal change but the activity of 
intellectual apprehension. Aristotle’s doctrines of knowledge as identity of intellect 
and the intelligible, and of divine intellect as thinking itself, are therefore in continuity 
with Plato, and Plotinus’ doctrine of intellect and being is continuous with both Plato 
and Aristotle.
Keywords
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Plato’s forms are often characterized—not to say caricaturized—as inert, life-
less objects, enthroned in a “Platonic heaven” like so many lumps of intelligible 
stone. In the Sophist, however, in a passage which is usually altogether ignored 
* Extensive portions of this article have appeared previously in Perl (2014).
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in such accounts of Plato’s thought, Plato himself expressly ridicules this con-
ception of intelligible reality. The “friends of the forms” (248a4), we are told, 
say that “by the body through sensation we commune with becoming, but 
through reasoning, by the soul, with real reality, which you say is always the 
same, while becoming is different at different times” (248a10-13). The Eleatic 
Stranger takes the supposed “changelessness” of real reality to mean that, 
according to the “friends,” it neither does (δρᾶν, 248c5; ποιεῖν, 248c8) nor under-
goes (πάσχειν, 248c8) any activity. He then points out that if knowing and being 
known are things done and undergone (248d4-e4), these would therefore, 
according to the “friends,” be excluded from real reality, and exclaims, “But, by 
Zeus! Shall we easily be persuaded that, truly, motion and life and soul and 
thought are not present in that which completely is [τῷ παντελῶς ὄντι], that it 
neither lives nor thinks, but, solemn and holy, not having intellect, it is stand-
ing unmoved?” (248e6-249a2). This, Theaetetus replies, would be a “dreadful 
thing to say” (δεινὸν . . . λόγον). To avoid this conclusion, we must somehow 
admit into “that which completely is” intellect, life, soul, and hence, in some 
sense, motion.
The interpretation of this passage marks one of the sharpest divisions 
between Neoplatonic and modern readings of Plato.1 According to the most 
common modern reading, Plato here recognizes, at last, that reality cannot con-
sist solely of immovable forms, but must include also moving beings, whether 
this means changeable things in general2 or only souls.3 The forms are here 
1 The Neoplatonic interpretation of this passage has had a few modern defenders, notably 
Pépin (1965); Vogel (1986); and, most recently and thoroughly, Gerson (2006). Neither Vogel 
nor Gerson, however, defends this interpretation by a meticulous reading of the passage such 
as is undertaken here (Part III). Moreover, they argue for this interpretation only on the basis 
of the Sophist itself, the Timaeus, and (in Gerson’s case) the Laws, thus suggesting that they 
accept the diachronic reading of the dialogues that is rejected here; see below, n. 28. The 
present study both supports Gerson’s conclusion by providing different and more ample 
argumentation for it, and widens its scope by addressing the Sophist passage in relation to a 
broader range of issues, e.g., the “ocular metaphor” for knowledge and the developmental 
approach to the dialogues. 
2 E.g., Brown (1998) 201-3. 
3 E.g., Cornford (1935) 245; Leigh (2010) 77 and n. 28. Ross (1951) 108-11, seems to adopt both 
positions. He says first (111), “What [Plato] does in the Sophistes is to recognize, more explic-
itly than ever before, two elements in reality—universal Forms and individual souls.” But he 
continues, “Finally, summing up the argument, [Plato] says that reality must include all 
things immovable and movable; the immovable Forms which alone the Friends of the Forms 
admit to be real, the movable bodies which alone the materialists admit to be real, and the 
souls which have ‘movements of their own’.”
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interpreted as “objects of knowledge,” and as such extrinsic to the thought that 
knows them. This is of a piece with Plato’s supposed commitment to an “ocular 
metaphor” for knowledge, that is, a conception of knowledge as a “gaze” of the 
soul at intelligible objects extrinsic to itself. On this interpretation, therefore, 
Plato here realizes that in order to allow for knowledge we must admit not only 
the forms but also intelligence, life, and motion into reality. This passage is thus 
taken as a prime example of the increasingly discredited notion of chronologi-
cal development in Plato’s thought:4 in the so-called “middle” dialogues, such 
as the Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Republic, only the immovable forms are regarded 
as “really real,” while in the “late” Sophist Plato admits moving things into 
full reality.5
Plotinus, however, who of course never dreams of reading Plato in devel-
opmental terms, interprets this passage very differently. He sees it as one of 
the clearest statements within Plato’s dialogues of his own doctrine of the 
unity-in-duality of intellect and being, or the forms. Plotinus argues that since 
intellect (νοῦς) in its purity just is the act of intellectual apprehension (νόησις), 
it has being as its very content and thus “is itself the things which it thinks” 
(V.9.5.7). If, on the other hand, being were extrinsic to intellect, then what intel-
lect actually apprehends would be not being itself but only an impression or 
representation of it. Intellect, therefore, would not know reality itself, or, more 
precisely, would not be the very knowledge of reality: “If one grants that these 
things [i.e., the intelligibles] are most outside [of intellect], and that intellect, 
having them, beholds them thus [i.e., as outside itself], it is necessary that it 
not have what is true of them and be deceived in all things which it beholds. 
For they would be the true things; and it will behold them, not possessing them 
but receiving images of them in such knowledge. But if it does not possess 
what is true, but takes into itself images of the true, it will possess falsehoods 
and nothing true” (V.5.1.50-58). There would always be a difference between 
what intellect has, on the one hand, and reality itself, on the other, and hence 
its thinking, the thinking which it is, would not be true (cf. V.3.5.19-25). On this 
theory, then, intellect would not be the apprehension of reality itself, and so 
would not genuinely be intellect. “If then truth is not in intellect, such an intel-
lect will not be truth, or truly intellect, nor will it be intellect at all” (V.5.1.65-67). 
In order to be knowledge, thinking must coincide with being. Conversely, if 
being were extrinsic to intellect, then being itself, as distinct from an image, 
impression, or representation of being, could not be that which is thought or 
4 On reasons for rejecting the diachronic reading of Plato see, inter alia, Desjardins (2004) 
89-90 n. 24; Griswold (2002); Howland (1991).
5 E.g., Cornford (1935) 242-43; Sayre (2005) 224-25. 
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known. Thus if intellect and the intelligibles were separate from each other, 
not only would intellect not be intellect, because it would not be the appre-
hension of being, but also the intelligible would not be intelligible, because 
it could not be apprehended by intellect. In order to be what is known, being 
must coincide with thinking. “One must not, then, seek the intelligibles out-
side [of intellect], nor say that there are impressions of being in intellect, nor, 
depriving it of truth, produce ignorance and non-existence of the intelligibles 
and, further, abolish intellect itself” (V.5.2.1-4).
Plotinus concludes, therefore, that “since it is necessary to bring in knowl-
edge and truth and to preserve the beings and knowledge of what each is,” 
and that if we could not know beings themselves “we would have an image 
and trace of each, and would not have and be with [συνόντας] and be joined 
together with the things themselves,” it follows that “all things must be given 
[δοτέον] to the true intellect” (V.5.2.4-9). Intellect and being, then, do not stand 
apart as “subject” and “object,” two separate spheres or realms having only an 
extrinsic relation, but “are together” (συνόντας). Thus in adopting the ocular 
metaphor for knowledge Plotinus expressly eliminates any separation between 
“subject” and “object” that this might be taken to imply: “If, then, sight is of the 
external, there must not be sight, or only thus, as the same as that which is 
seen” (V.8.11.21-22). The forms, therefore, are not inert “objects” but are the con-
tents of living intelligence and as such are one with it in the unity of act and 
content, apprehension and the apprehended. “But if intellection and the intel-
ligible are the same—for the intelligible is an activity [ἐνέργεια]; for it is not a 
potentiality, and not unintelligible, nor apart from life, nor, again, do living and 
thinking come from without to another being, as if to a stone or something 
inanimate—then the intelligible is the primary reality” (V.3.5.31-35). It is in this 
sense that motion, life, and intelligence, but not temporal change, belong to 
“that which completely is.”
According to most modern interpreters, this doctrine has no real basis in 
Plato, but is rather Plotinus’ original (or perverse) development of Aristotle’s 
doctrines that “contemplative knowledge and that which is known in this way 
are the same” (On the Soul Γ.4, 429b30-430a5) and that the unmoved mover 
is “thought thinking itself” or “the thinking of thinking” (Metaphysics Λ.7, 
1072b20; Λ.9, 1074b35). I propose to argue, on the contrary, that in this respect 
both Aristotle and Plotinus are in accord with Plato. The coinciding of intel-
lect and the intelligibles is not only the best interpretation of the Sophist, on 
the basis of a meticulous reading of the text, but also Plato’s consistent under-
standing of the relation between intelligible being and intellectual apprehen-
sion. Not only in the Sophist, but throughout the dialogues, Plato regards the 
forms not as lifeless objects extrinsic to, apart from, or over against thought 
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or knowledge, but rather as the content of and thus together with the activity 
of intellectual apprehension. This activity in its purity is the demiurge or god, 
who is therefore one with divine, intelligible being. The human soul, in turn, 
is together with the forms just insofar as it partakes in this activity or, as Plato 
puts it, “has intellect.” Plato never understands knowledge as a mere “gaze” 
of the soul at intelligible “objects” extrinsic to itself, but always as a συνουσία, 
a togetherness with being which is represented not merely by the metaphor 
of seeing but by those of touching, grasping, eating, and sexual union. The 
Sophist’s insistence that life, intellect, and in this sense motion must belong 
to “that which completely is” is therefore not a change in Plato’s thought but 
accords with his understanding of the relation between intellect and the intel-
ligible as we find it throughout the dialogues.
1 Knowledge as συνουσία
Plato’s extensive use of the “ocular metaphor” for knowledge which is implicit 
in the very words εἶδος and ἰδέα, according to which the forms are “looks” that 
the soul “sees,” is often taken to mean that Plato thinks of knowledge in terms 
of an extrinsic relationship between the knower as “subject” and the forms 
as “objects.” But if we find such a subject-object dualism in Plato, this is only 
because we ourselves are thinking like moderns and presuppose that “see-
ing” must be interpreted in this way. In fact, what Plato means by “seeing” is 
much closer to what in phenomenological terms is called “intuition,”6 which 
may be analyzed into the intentionality of apprehension and the givenness 
of that which is apprehended. Understood in this way, “seeing” implies not 
extrinsic objectification and representation but, on the contrary, the immedi-
ate togetherness of seeing and seen. Insofar as I see anything, I am “out there” 
with that which is seen, and, conversely, that which is seen is “in” me as the 
content of my visual awareness. Seeing, or any mode of awareness, implies not 
a separation between subject and object but rather a joining, a being-together, 
of apprehension and reality. And it is in precisely these terms that Plato pres-
ents the relation between intellectual apprehension and intelligible being, or 
the forms. The forms, as intelligible “looks,” are given to and are thus in intel-
lect as its content, and indeed Plato occasionally refers to them not only as 
νοητά and γνωστά, intelligible and knowable, but as νοούμενα and γιγνωσκόμενα 
(e.g., Republic 580c1, e2). The common translation of these terms as “objects 
6 This term, we should note, translates German Anschauung and is derived from Latin intuere, 
both of which refer to “beholding.”
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of thought” and “objects of knowledge” is misleading. The term ‘object,’ like its 
German equivalent Gegenstand, implies something that stands “over against” 
and is thus extrinsic to thinking or knowing. The Greek participles, on the 
other hand, mean rather “that which is thought” and “that which is known,” 
or, still more briefly and precisely, “the thought,” “the known,” and thus imply 
rather the content of thinking and knowing. Conversely, the soul, insofar as 
it is intellectual, is together with the forms, possessing them as that-which-
it-thinks or knows. Plato thus understands the relation of thought and being 
not as an extrinsic subject-object duality but as a συνουσία or being-together, a 
conjugal union of the knowing and the known.
One of the chief ways in which Plato expresses this togetherness is through 
the myth of recollection, the central point of which is that the soul does not 
take in the forms from outside, but discovers them within itself. It is all too 
rarely recognized that Plato’s account of our coming to know the forms as a 
recollection of what we knew in a previous, discarnate existence but forgot 
upon being born in the body is not a “theory” or a “doctrine” but a myth, even 
though it is clearly presented as such not only in the Phaedrus but in the 
Phaedo and the Meno as well.7 In the Meno, it is first introduced as a tale told 
by priests and poets (81a10-b6). Then, upon completing the argument for rec-
ollection through the discovery of mathematical knowledge in the untaught 
slave-boy, Socrates says, “Then if for us the truth of beings is always in the soul 
[ἀεὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχὴ εἴη], the soul would be immortal, 
so that you must boldly try to seek and to recollect [ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι] what you 
do not now know, that is, what you do not remember [μεμνημένος] . . . I would 
not altogether rely on this account in other respects; but if we hold it necessary 
to seek what one does not know we would be better and more courageous 
and less idle than if we hold that it is not possible to find it and need not seek: 
for this I would altogether contend in both word and deed” (86b1-c2). The key 
point on which Socrates insists, then, is not the tale itself, but that knowledge 
is possible for us, and hence we must seek it, because “the truth of beings is 
7 For a thorough account of why recollection should be regarded as a myth see Dorter (1972) 
215-17. Dorter summarizes (217): “There are thus a number of reasons for supposing the doc-
trine of recollection to be a genetic myth depicting the relationship between the embodied 
soul and the forms: the indications in the direction of the purification acount that occur 
toward the end of the discussion of recollection in the Phaedo; the mythological context in 
which the doctrine of recollection is always presented; the simplemindedness of the details 
of recollection, and their incompatibility with those of purification; the depiction of the ‘pre-
natal’ soul in the Phaedrus, as tripartite, which implies that it is really incarnate; the way in 
which the details of the Phaedrus myth echo those of the Phaedo’s account of incarnate 
learning; and the similarity between the Phaedrus myth and the genetic myth of the Timaeus.”
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always in the soul.” The real conclusion of the argument is not that the soul 
literally pre-exists but that “the truth of beings” is found not outside of but 
within the soul. This, indeed, is all that is justified by the conversation with 
the slave-boy: it shows, at most, that since he did not receive his knowledge 
of mathematical truth from outside, he discovered it within himself. It does 
not and cannot prove that he acquired this knowledge at some time in the 
past, before he was born. The word “always” points in the same direction: if the 
truth is always in the soul, then it was not received at some time in a previous 
existence prior to which it was not there, but rather is intrinsic to the soul. The 
story that this knowledge was acquired in a previous existence must therefore 
be taken as a mythic expression of the soul’s intrinsic possession of truth, that 
is, of intelligible reality.
In the Phaedrus, Socrates likens the soul to a pair of winged horses and their 
charioteer, and describes its “journey,” following the gods, to “the place above 
the sky”8 (247c3) where it “beholds” (247d3, d5-6) the forms. The strongly 
visual imagery and the references to a “place” may incline us to read this as a 
pre-natal voyage to “another world.” But Socrates has already warned us that 
he is telling not “what the soul actually is” but rather “what it is like” (246a5) 
and later expressly refers to this story as a “mythic hymn” (265c1). The “place 
above the sky” is not in fact a place, since what is “there” has no shape or color, 
is not bodily at all. And if the spatial dimension of the soul’s “journey” is obvi-
ously metaphorical, then so too is the temporal dimension. To imagine, that 
is, to picture the soul pre-existing in time, is necessarily to picture it being in 
some place at that time. The flight, therefore, must rather be understood as a 
mythic representation of the psychic, cognitive attainment of an intellectual 
apprehension of the forms “themselves by themselves.” The forms are meta-
phorically represented in spatial terms as “outside” the entire cosmos in that 
they are not themselves sensible things, not additional members of the sen-
sible world. Likewise, they are represented as being known prior to our birth in 
that they do not come to us from outside, by way of sense-perception. That the 
soul’s flight is a metaphor for intellectual apprehension becomes still more evi-
dent when Socrates describes the “fall” of the human soul as a turning to τροφῇ 
δοξαστῇ, “opinion-food” (248b5). The fall is thus a descent to a lesser mode of 
apprehension, to opinion rather than knowledge. The entire myth of the soul’s 
flight, its fall, and its recollection of what it saw must therefore be understood 
not literally, as a chronological narrative of the soul’s life-history, but rather as a 
8 Translating this phrase as “the place beyond heaven” obscures the spatial imagery of a geo-
centric cosmos in which one may ascend from earth, through the celestial spheres, to the 
place that is literally above the sky and thus outside the entire cosmos.
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mythic representation of different levels of cognitive apprehension. The divine 
level is the intellectual apprehension of forms; the human soul, as imperfectly 
intellectual, is not at this level but may be on its way to it, working from the 
multiplicity of sensible appearances toward intelligible unities. Thus, later in 
the Phaedrus, Socrates describes the “method of collection and division,” or 
dialectic, as “seeing them together, gathering into one form [εἰς μίαν . . . ἰδέαν] 
the things that are scattered everywhere” and “being able to cut according to 
forms [κατ᾿ εἴδη] at the natural joints” (265d3-4, 265e1-2). He then alludes back 
to the myth: “I myself am a lover of these divisions and collections, so that I 
may be able to speak and think; and if I judge that anyone else is able to see a 
one which is by nature over many, I follow ‘behind in his track as if he were a 
god’ ” (266b3-7). To “follow a god” to “the place above the sky” (247c3) is thus to 
recognize, intellectually, the intelligible forms that articulate sensible things, 
enabling them to be anything and enabling us “to speak and think,” to under-
stand the world, at all.
In the Phaedo, the soul’s “going to” the forms at death, and hence also its “com-
ing from” the forms at birth, is a less vivid and graphic version of the same myth. 
Here Plato expressly links the spatial and temporal aspects of the recollection-
story through the words of Cebes, who throughout the dialogue is shown to have 
an incorrigibly pictorial and bodily notion of the soul (e.g., 70a1-6; 87b4-88b8): 
“This [i.e., recollection] is impossible, unless our soul exists somewhere [που] 
before [πρὶν] it comes to be in this human form” (72e7-73a2). As the spatial 
location of the soul and the forms in “the place above the sky” (Phaedrus) or in 
“Hades” (Phaedo) is clearly mythic in that it represents both the soul and the 
forms as bodies, so is the temporal location of the soul and the forms that is 
implied by “pre-existence.” Taken literally in a temporal sense, the story of pre-
existence and recollection is altogether grotesque: it would mean that at a cer-
tain date, say, in 429 B.C.E., a year before Plato’s birth, Plato’s soul was “above 
the sky,” “looking at” the forms. This not only assimilates the soul to a body, but 
assimilates intellectual apprehension to sense-perception, a taking in of con-
tent from outside, whereas the whole point of the recollection-story is that our 
knowledge of the forms is not taken in from outside but is “always in the soul.”
What the argument for recollection in the Phaedo actually demonstrates is 
that our knowledge of the forms is non-empirical in just this sense. Socrates 
begins by making the distinction between equal things and “the equal itself,” or 
the form equality: “We say, I suppose, that there is something equal, I mean not 
a stick [equal] to a stick or a stone to a stone or anything else of that sort, but 
besides all these things something else, the equal itself” (74a9-11; cf. 74c4-5). 
He then asks, “Whence do receive knowledge of it?” (74b4). We do in fact have 
such knowledge: if we did not know such a criterion, we could not identify any-
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thing we experience as unequal. “When someone, seeing something, thinks 
that what I now see wants to be such as some other of beings but is deficient 
and is not able to be such as that, but is inferior, it is necessary, I suppose, that 
he who is thinking this knows beforehand [προειδότα] that to which he says it 
is like, but deficiently” (74d9-e4). For that matter, without the knowledge of 
equality neither could we identify anything we experience as equal. In making 
such judgments, we are bringing to bear an idea of equality and saying that 
the things perceived either do or do not display this “look.” On the one hand, 
the experience of equal things is what, as we say, “calls to mind,” or arouses in 
us, the knowledge of equality: “From these equal things, although they are dif-
ferent from that equal, you have nonetheless come to think and have received 
the knowledge of it” (74c7-9). On the other hand, sense-experience does not 
provide or account for this knowledge. Since equality itself, like any form, is 
not a sensible thing but an intelligible idea, it cannot come to us by way of the 
senses. Nor can we have arrived at it by “abstraction” from what we perceive, 
for this would require that we first identify such things as equal, which in turn 
requires that we already have the idea of equality. Since we apply this paradig-
matic idea in judging what we perceive, our knowledge of it is in some sense 
prior to sense-experience: “Then it must be that before we began to see and 
hear and otherwise sense, we received knowledge of what the equal itself is, 
if we were going to refer thither the equal things from the senses . . .” (75b4-7). 
Consequently, Plato uses the metaphor of recollection to describe this discov-
ery within ourselves of something that does not come into us from outside by 
way of the senses. The metaphor is both apt and powerful, because of the odd-
ity of the everyday experience of forgetting and recalling. If I have forgotten 
something, or simply happen not to be thinking of it at the moment, in a sense 
I do not know it: it is not present to my awareness, I am not apprehending it. 
But if, upon being reminded, I recall it, I do not re-acquire it as a new piece 
of knowledge. Rather, I discover it within myself as something that, in some 
sense, I knew all along. What we have forgotten but can recall we both know, in 
that it is within us, and do not know, in that we are not currently apprehending 
it. Recollection thus serves as a superb metaphor for our coming to know the 
forms, which in one sense we do not initially know but which, “by using the 
senses” (75e3), we recognize as always already at work within our cognition.
The soul’s “pre-existence,” then, must be taken as a metaphorical expres-
sion of its intrinsic possession of intelligible reality within itself. Just as, in the 
Meno, the real conclusion of the argument for recollection is that “the truth 
of beings is always in the soul,” so too, in the Phaedo, the conclusion is that 
intelligible reality “is ours” (76e1-2). Since our knowledge of the forms does 
not come into us by way of the senses, it is non-empirical and in that sense 
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a priori. We rarely notice that this common philosophical expression, which 
has become sedimented as a technical term for that aspect of our cognition 
which is not empirical, is itself a temporal metaphor. What is a priori is “prior” 
to sense-experience only in the sense that it does not come to us by way of such 
experience. The meaning of Plato’s myth is that our knowledge of the forms is 
a priori in just this sense. Indeed, whenever we speak of an a priori dimension 
of knowledge not only are we using a metaphor, but, whether we realize it or 
not, we are invoking Plato’s myth of pre-existence and prior knowledge. Since 
we do not mean it literally ourselves, why should we think that Plato does so, 
when in fact he openly tells us that it is a myth?
The myth of pre-existence and recollection is thus an expression of the 
human condition as “in between,” a condition of not being gods, that is, not 
being sheer intellectual apprehension itself, and yet capable of attaining such 
apprehension to some degree. This is indicated by the distinction in the Meno 
between “remembering” (μεμνημένος), that is, immediately apprehending, and 
“recollecting” (ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι), that is, working toward apprehension (86b3-4). 
Such attainment is possible because of the latent presence within us of divine, 
intelligible being. What the argument shows is that the forms are in us, for 
without them we could not think at all or make any identifying judgments 
about what we perceive. Intelligible being must belong intrinsically to the 
soul, for otherwise we could never come to know it and thus would not be 
capable of intellection. Since intellect, that is, intellectual apprehension, just 
is the possession of the forms, it follows that intelligible reality lies not out-
side of but within such apprehension, and hence within us insofar as we “have 
intellect.” The real point of the story of recollection, then, is not literal, tempo-
ral pre-existence, but rather interiority: we do not take in divine, intelligible 
being from outside, but find it within ourselves. Intelligible being, therefore, is 
not apart from but is rather contained within living intelligence, the activity of 
intellectual apprehension.
Thus when Plato presents knowledge in terms of the “ocular metaphor,” he 
expressly understands this not as an extrinsic duality but rather as a joining 
together of the seeing and the seen. In laying out the analogy of the good to 
the sun, he observes first that light is the “yoke” that “yokes together” vision 
and the visible. “By no small idea, then, the sense of sight and the power of 
being seen are yoked [ἐζύγησαν], by a more precious yoke [ζυγῷ] than the 
yokings-together [συζεύξεων] of other things, if light is not worthless” (Republic 
507e6-508a2).9 The term σύζευξις carries a wide range of meanings, from the 
9 Heidegger (1996) 230, takes this passage to indicate that truth is brought “under the yoke” of 
the ἱδέα. But Plato in fact uses the metaphor of the yoke to express not sub-jugation but 
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most literal, the uniting of two oxen under a common yoke, to marriage and 
sexual union. In the same way, our Latinate word ‘conjugal’ refers to marriage 
under the image of “yoking together.” Having described vision in these terms, 
Plato continues, “This, then, say I called the offspring of the good, which the 
good begot as an analogue to itself; what that [i.e., the good] is in the intel-
ligible place, with regard to intellect and the things that are thought [τε νοῦν 
καὶ τὰ νοούμενα], this [i.e., the sun] is in the visible, with regard to sight and the 
things that are seen” (508b12-c2). Just as the sun, in providing light, enables the 
togetherness of seeing and the seen without which there is neither any seeing 
nor anything seen, so the good enables the togetherness of intellect and the 
intelligible, without which there is neither any intellectual apprehension nor 
anything apprehended. “Say, then, that this, which provides truth to the things 
known and gives power to that which knows, is the idea of the good” (508e1-3). 
This is precisely why, as Plato goes on to say, “not only is their being known 
present to the things that are known by the good, but also that their being and 
reality [τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν] come to them by it . . .” (509b6-8).
Plato frequently expresses this togetherness by describing knowledge as a 
συνουσία, a “being-with” the forms. In the Phaedo, he uses this term to refer 
both to the unphilosophical soul’s association with the body and to the philo-
sophical soul’s communion with intelligible, divine reality (e.g., 81c5, 83e3; see 
also 68a6-7). Like σύζευξις, this word, signifying most literally “being-with” or 
“being-together,” expresses a wide range of meanings, from social to educa-
tional to sexual intercourse, and was used by the Greeks to refer, among other 
things, to the relationship, at once educational and sexual, between ἐραστής 
and ἐρώμενος. In Plato’s usage this term often has strongly sexual connotations. 
In the Seventh Letter (341c6) it refers to a philosophically transformed ver-
sion of the ἐραστής-ἐρώμενος relationship. In the Symposium, the party itself is 
referred to as a συνουσία (172c1; 173a4, b3), and in the culmination of Diotima’s 
speech she first uses this term in its erotic sense, with regard to the boys whom 
lovers are eager to “see and be with [ὁρῶντες τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ συνόντες]” and again 
“to behold and be with [θεᾶσθαι . . . καὶ συνεῖναι]” (211d6-8), and then applies 
it to the philosopher’s relationship with the form of the beautiful itself: “Do 
you think, then, that it would be a poor life for a man, looking at and behold-
ing that in the way that is necessary, and being with [συνόντος] it? Or do you 
not think . . . that only there will it come about for him, seeing the beautiful by 
that to which it is visible, to beget not images of virtue, in that he is not laying 
hold of an image, but true [virtue], in that he is laying hold of what is true?” 
con-jugation, the joining together of seeing and the seen or knowing and the known. See 
Peperzak (1997) 101. 
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(211e4-212a5). The intellectual soul’s relation to intelligible being, then, is no 
mere extrinsic “looking at,” but is rather an intimate communion, a possession, 
a “mingling” or “joining” represented by the image of sexual union.
Indeed, Plato is by no means exclusively wedded to the “ocular metaphor” 
for knowledge. He frequently presents knowledge not only under the meta-
phor of vision but also under those of touching, holding, sexual union, and 
eating.10 Thus in the Symposium the philosopher can “beget” (τίκτειν) true 
virtue because he “lays hold of” (ἐφαπτομένῳ) the beautiful itself. Likewise in 
the Phaedo, we are told that the philosopher’s soul “touches” or “lays hold of” 
(ἐφαπτομένη, 79d6) divine reality, and that it is “nourished” (τρεφομένη) by 
“the true and divine” (84a8-b1). In the Phaedrus, the soul not only “sees” but 
is “nourished” (τρεφομένη, 247d2; τρέφεται, 247d4) and “feasts on” (ἑστιαθεῖσα, 
247e3) true being. In Republic IX Plato gives an extended description of the 
soul’s being nourished and filled (πλήρωσις, 585b9; πληρούμενον, πληροῦσθαι, 
585d8, 11, 12) by intelligible reality (585b9-586b4). Such expressions, implying 
that intelligible reality is the food and thus the very content of the intellectual 
soul, indicate a far more intimate union than a mere extrinsic gaze. In Republic 
VI Plato draws together the images of holding, eating, and sexual union to 
express the nature of knowledge: “It is natural that the true lover of learn-
ing strives toward being [τὸ ὄν], and does not remain with each of the many 
things that are opined [δοξαζομένοις] to be, but proceeds and does not dull or 
cease from love [ἔρωτος] until he grasps [ἅψασθαι] the nature of each thing 
which is by that in the soul to which it is proper to lay hold [ἐφάπτεσθαι] of 
this—proper, as akin; having approached and coupled [μιγεὶς] with that which 
really is [τῷ ὄντι ὄντως], having begotten [γεννήσἂ]) intellect and truth [νοῦν καὶ 
αλήθειαν], he knows and truly lives and is nourished [τρέφοιτο] . . .” (490a8-b6). 
Intellect and truth are engendered, or come to be, in the soul, just insofar as 
it “couples” with real being, because intellect and truth just are the possession 
10 Rorty (1979) 38-39, remarks, “There was . . . no particular reason why this ocular metaphor 
seized the imagination of the founders of Western thought. But it did . . . The notion of 
‘contemplation,’ of knowledge of universal concepts or truth as θεωρία, makes the Eye of 
the Mind the inescapable model for the better sort of knowledge. But it is fruitless to ask 
whether the Greek language, or Greek economic conditions, or the idle fancy of some 
nameless pre-Socratic, is responsible for viewing this sort of knowledge, as looking at 
something (rather than, say, rubbing up against it, or crushing it underfoot, or having 
sexual intercourse with it).” Rorty later, following Heidegger, associates the “ocular meta-
phor” specifically with Plato (157, 159, 162-63). In view of Plato’s regular and repeated 
accounts of intellectual knowledge in terms of, precisely, touching, holding, eating, and 
sexual intercourse, this is either disingenuous or indicative of a profound ignorance of, or 
disregard for, the text of Plato.
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and the givenness of being. The images of eating and sexual union, in particu-
lar, imply not merely no distance, but less-than-zero distance, between intel-
lect and the intelligible. These metaphors thus represent a coinciding in which 
the two are joined in such a way that they occupy, so to speak, the same space 
and thus “are together:” συνουσία. Far from thinking of knowledge as an objec-
tifying “gaze” of the soul upon intelligible “objects” extrinsic to itself, Plato 
understands intellectual apprehension as a “being with” the forms, a possess-
ing of intelligible being as its content, and, correspondingly, intelligible being 
as contained within intellectual apprehension. “The truth of beings is always 
in the soul” (Meno 86b1-2) and intelligible reality “is ours” (Phaedo 76e1).
2 Demiurge and Paradigm
The human soul, as we have seen, is not pure intellect but can be said to “have 
intellect” just insofar as it apprehends, possesses, or “is with” intelligible being. 
In the Timaeus, which is closely linked to the Sophist by the latter’s reference 
to the natural world as the work of a “crafting God [θεοῦ δημιουργοῦντος]” and 
of “divine art [θείᾳ τέχνῃ]” (265c5, e2), Plato offers a story of the construction 
of the sensible cosmos by a god who just is intellect itself, and who is char-
acterized as the δημιουργός, the craftsman, of the cosmos. What distinguishes 
craftsmanship from other modes of production, such as mechanical causation 
or biological procreation, is that a craftsman works intelligently, arranging his 
material according to a pattern, a plan or design, a paradigm, that is grasped by 
thought. So, for instance, in the Cratylus, Plato remarks that a carpenter makes 
a shuttle “looking to” (βλέπων) the form (τὸ εἶδος) which is “what a shuttle is” 
(389a6-b6). Likewise, in the Republic, Plato depicts the philosopher-king as an 
artist or craftsman (δημιουργὸν, 500d6) and says that such people, in “paint-
ing” a virtuous city and virtuous souls, “would look [ἀποβλέποιεν] in either 
direction, toward the just and beautiful and moderate and all such things by 
nature [i.e., the forms justice, beauty, etc.], and toward what they are making 
in humans . . .” (501b1-4). In Republic X, the craftsman (δημιουργὸς) of a table or 
a bed makes each by looking (βλέπων) to the form (ἰδέαν) of each (596b6-8). 
For Plato, then, artistic production or craftsmanship, demiurgy, is always a 
matter of “looking to” an intelligible paradigm and arranging the product so 
that it becomes an image of it. To say that the world as a whole is a work of 
divine craftsmanship is thus to say that, just as a work of human art reflects 
the paradigm that the artist beholds in his mind, so the cosmos expresses, or 
is an image of, the intelligible paradigm that the divine intellect apprehends: 
“Having been generated thus, it was crafted [δεδημιούργηται] according to that 
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which is apprehended [περιληπτὸν] by reason and thought and is always the 
same. These things being the case, again, there is every necessity that this cos-
mos is an image of something” (Timaeus 29a6-b2).
This is often taken to imply, once again, an extrinsic duality in which the 
forms are inert objects outside of and over against the divine intellect that 
“sees” them. But as we have seen, intellectual apprehension is the possession 
of and thus “is together” with intelligible reality. Unlike a human soul, which 
is not purely intellectual but may be said to “have intellect” and thus to share 
in divinity to a greater or lesser extent just insofar as it apprehends intelligible 
reality, the demiurge of the cosmos just is intellect, which is to say that he is 
intellectual apprehension or intelligence itself. As such, therefore, he coincides 
with the forms. Indeed, the term περιληπτὸν at 29a7, here translated as “appre-
hended,” means more literally “embraced” or “surrounded,” and thus implies 
the containment of the paradigm by the divine intellect. A human craftsman, 
e.g., an architect, does not discover a blueprint extrinsic to himself and con-
struct a house according to it. Rather, the pattern, the paradigm of the house, 
is in his mind as his idea, the content of his thought. If the architect is not 
altogether one with his idea, this is because a human architect is not nothing 
but the thinking of this paradigm. The demiurge of the cosmos, on the other 
hand, is nothing but thinking, nothing but intellectual apprehension itself, and 
thus is one with that which he thinks, that is, intelligible reality, the paradigm 
of the cosmos.11
Plato consistently presents the relation between craftsman and paradigm 
in just this way. In the Republic, explaining why only the philosopher is suited 
to rule the city, he points out that the “lovers of sight and sounds,” “having no 
clear paradigm in their soul [μηδὲν ἐναργὲς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχοντες παράδειγμα], can-
not, as painters do, looking to [ἀποβλέποντες] what is most true, always refer-
ring thither and beholding it as precisely as possible, thus establish here laws 
concerning beautiful and just and good things . . .” (484c7-d2). This implies that 
the philosopher, on the other hand, insofar as he knows the forms or “has intel-
lect,” does have such a “clear,” that is, intelligible, paradigm in his soul. Thus 
Plato subsequently remarks that that philosopher “seeing and beholding things 
that are ordered and always the same, neither wronging nor being wronged by 
each other, being all in order according to reason, imitates these things and 
11 This must not be mistaken for the quite different theory that the forms are “thoughts of 
god” in the sense that the demiurge is prior to and produces or “makes up” the forms. 
Rather, the forms, taken all together as one whole, are the content of the act-of-thinking 
which is the demiurge. Neither the seeing nor the seen, the apprehension nor the appre-
hended, can be prior to the other. Cf. Vogel (1986) 206.
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is likened to them as far as possible. Or do you suppose there is any way in 
which someone can consort [ὁμιλεῖ] with what he admires without becom-
ing like it? . . . Then the philosopher, consorting [ὁμιλῶν] with what is divine 
and orderly, becomes as orderly and divine as is possible for a man” (500c2-d1). 
The term that Plato twice uses here to describe the relation between the phi-
losopher and the divine reality that he “beholds” is ὁμιλεῖν, which, much like 
συνεῖναι, signifies anything from social to marital to sexual togetherness, and 
indeed is used conjointly and synonymously with συνεῖναι at Phaedo 81c5. It is 
at this point in the Republic that he depicts the philosopher as a “craftsman” 
who “looks to” to the forms and “paints” the virtuous city and souls “using the 
divine paradigm” (500d6-e4). Significantly, these two passages, describing the 
philosopher as a craftsman with the divine paradigm in his soul, occur shortly 
before and shortly after the graphic account of the philosopher’s soul coupling 
with and being nourished by real being (490a8-b7). In characterizing the phi-
losopher as a craftsman, then, Plato indicates that his soul is in communion 
(ὁμιλία) with the intelligible paradigm to which it looks, and that this para-
digm, as that which he “sees,” that is, apprehends intellectually, is not separate 
from but is in his soul.
So, in the Timaeus, we are told that the demiurge of the cosmos “looked 
to” (ἔβλεπεν, 29a3) the eternal, intelligible paradigm in making the world. As 
we have seen, this “ocular metaphor” for intellectual apprehension implies not 
an extrinsic subject-object relationship but rather the “yoking” or “together-
ness” of knowing and the known: the seeing is with the seen and the seen is in 
the seeing. Thus, as Plato here says, the paradigm is apprehended (περιληπτὸν, 
29a7), that is, more literally, “embraced” or “surrounded,” by thought. The demi-
urge and the forms, then, are united in the συνουσία of intellectual apprehen-
sion and intelligible content. The forms, taken all together as the totality of all 
possible thought-contents, constitute thought itself, that is, the demiurge. The 
world, we may say, reflects intelligence, which is both the act-of-thinking, i.e. 
god or the demiurge, and that-which-is-thought, i.e. the forms or the paradigm. 
In this way we can understand Plato’s references to the paradigm of the cosmos 
as “the intelligible living thing” (39e1) and as the “living thing . . . of which the 
other living things . . . are parts. For,” he continues, “that [i.e., that living thing] 
possesses all the intelligible living things, embracing them in itself [ἐν ἑαυτῷ 
περιλαβὸν]” (30c3-8). We should note Plato’s use of the same term to mean 
“contained” that he employed just before, at 29a7, to refer to the paradigm as 
“apprehended” by thought. If the intelligibles were inert objects, extrinsic to 
the living intelligence that “sees” them, how could they be living? But if we 
recognize that the seen, or known, is not outside of the seeing or knowing, 
these references make perfect sense: the forms are living as the contents of 
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living intelligence, of thought itself. Thus Plato characterizes the paradigm in 
a variety of ways. First he calls it “that which is changeless and is apprehended 
[or embraced/surrounded] by reason and thought” (29a6-b1). A few lines 
later he says that the demiurge “wanted all things to become as like himself 
[παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ] as possible” (29e3), suggesting that the paradigm of the 
cosmos is the demiurge himself. Next he calls the paradigm the “living thing” 
of which all other intelligible living things are parts (30c3-6). Taken together, 
these passages suggest that the forms, the demiurge, and the intelligible liv-
ing thing are different ways of referring to the same paradigmatic  reality.12 In 
that the sensible cosmos is an image of intelligible being, or the forms, it is a 
likeness of the demiurge himself, because these forms are the content of intel-
lectual apprehension. As such it is an image of “the intelligible living thing,” for 
the paradigm thus unites, in indissoluble togetherness, the act-of-thinking and 
that-which-is-thought. Just as an image of the forms, the world is an image of 
living intelligence itself.
3 The Motion of Intellect
In the Sophist, then, when Plato ridicules the conception of the forms as lifeless 
objects divorced from intellectual apprehension, he is repudiating a notion of 
intelligible being that was never his own. In the developmental reading, this 
passage is taken to mean that, contrary to the doctrine of the “middle dia-
logues,” Plato is now including not only changeless, lifeless, intelligible forms 
but also living, changing things in the realm of being. On this interpretation, 
τῷ παντελῶς ὄντι must be understood to mean “being as a whole,” and motion 
is admitted into reality in the sense that “reality or the sum of things” includes 
living and moving things in addition to immovable forms. To support this read-
ing, the text of 249b5-6 is “emended” by the outright insertion of the word 
πάντων so that it reads, “It turns out that if all beings are immovable then there 
12 On reasons for not regarding the demiurge as an “efficient cause,” separate from the para-
digm and needed to account for the production of the cosmos, see Perl (1998) 83-85, esp. 85. 
When Timaeus introduces into his account of the cosmos a “third kind,” distinct from 
both the intelligible paradigm and the sensible image, this “third kind” is not the demi-
urge but the receptacle (48e2-49a6). He then (50c7-d4) likens the receptacle to a mother, 
the paradigm to a father, and the image to their offspring, again with no reference to the 
demiurge. Since earlier (28c2) he refers to the demiurge as the “father” of the cosmos, this 
too may suggest that demiurge and paradigm are two ways of regarding the same princi-
ple. This point is of little value in itself, but, taken in conjunction with other indications, 
could arguably provide further support for the unity of demiurge and paradigm. 
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is no intellect about anything anywhere,”13 implying that, on the contrary, some 
beings must be moved. According to this interpretation, the argument con-
tinues with the observation that if, on the other hand, all beings are moved, 
then likewise there can be no intellect (249b8-c5), for intellectual knowl-
edge requires immovable realities as its objects. Some beings, then, must be 
unmoved. The conclusion, therefore, is that “being and the all” (249d4) must 
include both immovable forms and moving things.14
But this interpretation cannot be sustained. First, τῷ παντελῶς ὄντι means 
not “being as a whole” but rather “that which completely is:” παντελῶς is an 
adverb expressing degree or intensity of being, not an adjective express-
ing inclusivity.15 Indeed, this is precisely the same phrase that Plato uses at 
Republic 477a3 to refer to the forms, or intelligible reality, identifying it as 
that which is completely knowable. So too, here in the Sophist, it refers to the 
intelligible as the wholly real. If motion were allowed into reality only in the 
sense that not forms alone but also moving things are beings, then the forms 
themselves would remain inert and lifeless, “not having intellect.”16 But it is 
precisely this view of intelligible reality, of the forms, that Plato is here mock-
ing and rejecting, and which is contradicted in the Timaeus as well, where the 
paradigm of the cosmos is identified as “the intelligible living thing.” The whole 
point of the Stranger’s argument is that intelligible being itself must in some 
sense involve life, thought, and motion. The wholly unwarranted insertion of 
πάντων at 249b5 is nothing but a flagrant case of altering the text to make it say 
what a certain interpretation requires, an egregious violation of basic philolog-
ical principles.17 What the Stranger actually says is, “It turns out that if beings 
are immovable [ἀκινήτων . . . ὄντων], then there is no intellect about anything 
13 This so-called emendation is endorsed by Cornford (1935) 241 n. 1; Ross (1951) 109 n. 1; 
Brown (1998) 202 n. 43; Bluck (1975) 99; White (1997) 271.
14 For a classic exposition of this reading of the passage see Cornford (1935) 241-47.
15 Cf. Vogel (1986) 196-97.
16 Cf. Vogel (1986) 196-97: “For, after all, the Stranger from Elea did not say that something 
had to be added to that solemn and holy world of ‘that which perfectly IS’—a moving 
kind of being to that which by its very nature was unmoving—, but his problem was: how 
that which IS in a perfect way (τὸ παντελῶς ὄν, not παντελές!), could itself be deprived of 
life and thinking. This problem could not be solved by adding to it a different kind of 
being which does possess life and thinking . . . [T]hat which is νοητόν properly speaking 
would remain as ‘solemn and holy’ as ever: no life and motion, no soul and thinking 
would be proper to it” (italics in original).
17 Tristram Shandy, book 3, ch. 37: “I’ve done it—said my father, snapping his fingers—See, 
my dear brother Toby, how I have mended the sense.—But you have marred a word, 
replied my uncle Toby.” 
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anywhere” (249b5-6).18 The point is not that some beings must be moved, but 
that beings in general, intelligible reality as a whole, must be moved, if there 
is to be intellect. Thus in the next speech, πάντ᾿ does not modify ὄντα, thereby 
suggesting that it ought to be included in the previous speech as well, but is 
rather substituted as an equivalent of ὄντα “And if, again, all things [πάντ᾿] are 
borne about and moved, on this account too we will take away the same thing 
[i.e., intellect] from beings” (249b8-10). The Stranger points out that in order to 
allow for intellectual knowledge, beings must, on the one hand, in some sense 
be moved, while all things—that is, the very same things, beings—must, on 
the other hand, in some sense also be immovable.
The equivalence of ὄντα and πάντα, referring to all beings taken together, is 
indicated by the chiastic use of the terms τὸ πᾶν and τὸ ὄν in the conclusion of 
the argument: “To the philosopher . . . it is necessary, for these reasons, neither 
to accept, from those who assert either one or many forms, that the all [τὸ πᾶν] 
is static, nor, again, to listen at all to those who in every way [πανταχῇ] move 
being [τὸ ὄν], but rather to say, as in the children’s prayer, that being and the 
all [τὸ ὄν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν] is as many things as are immovable and in motion [ὅσα 
ἀκίνητα καὶ κεκινημένα], both together” (249c10-d4). Here the singular τὸ πᾶν 
replaces ὄντων of 249b5, and the singular τὸ ὄν replaces πάντ᾿ of 249b8. The 
equivalence of these terms is then confirmed by their repetition in the explicit 
hendiadys τὸ ὄν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν, “being, that is, the all.” Thus the question to which 
the answer is “Both” is not, “Does being include immovable things or moving 
things?” but rather, “Is being as a singular totality immovable or moving?” Only 
this reading makes sense of the comparison to the “children’s prayer,” which 
implies a demand for two things that at least apparently exclude each other, a 
demand, as we say, to eat your cake and have it too. Even if the children’s prayer 
means only a demand for both of two offered alternatives,19 it still implies an 
insistence on both when it seems that we are required to choose one or the 
other. If the conclusion were merely that some beings are immovable and 
others are moving, there would be no paradox or apparent contradiction, no 
seemingly exclusive choice. Thus we are told that the philosopher, like a child 
demanding to “have it both ways,” must say, not, as the text is often translated, 
18 Surprisingly, neither Vogel (1986) nor Gerson (2006), in arguing against Cornford, Ross, 
et al., comments on this outrageous tampering with the text. Duerlinger (2009) 112 trans-
lates the text as it stands: “It follows then . . . that if beings are not in motion, nowhere is 
mind present in anything or concerned with anything.” 
19 A. A. Milne, Winnie the Pooh, ch. 2: “[W]hen Rabbit said, ‘Honey or condensed milk with 
your bread?’ [Pooh] was so excited that he said, ‘Both,’ and then, so as not to seem greedy, 
he added, ‘but don’t bother about the bread, please.’”
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that being is both the things that are immovable and the things that are in 
motion, but rather that it is “as many things as are immovable and in motion, 
both together:” the pronoun ὅσα is not repeated, thus again suggesting that it 
is the same things that must be both immovable (in some sense) and moving 
(in some sense). This accords with the requirement to reject the claim that 
being is in motion “in every way [πανταχῇ]” (249d2). The conclusion, there-
fore, is not that being consists both of things that are immovable and of things 
that are moving, but that being consists of things that are both immovable 
and moving.20
How then is this seeming contradiction to be resolved? Let us note that 
the only “motion” that is actually demanded by the argument and attributed 
to being is the intellectual activity of knowing and being known, a kind of 
“motion,” in the sense of doing and undergoing, that need not involve change 
in the sense of alteration over time. Being is thus both moving in the for-
mer sense and immovable in the latter sense.21 Aristotle later coins the term 
ἐνέργεια to refer to an activity which is not a movement (κίνησις) toward a not-
yet-achieved end, and, significantly, takes seeing and knowing as his prime 
examples of such activities (Metaphysics Θ.6, 1048b18-35). Plato’s terminol-
ogy is different in that he uses the word κίνησις to cover both motion in the 
sense of change and the changeless activity of intellectual apprehension, but 
the argument makes it clear that what he means by the “motion” and “life” of 
true reality is what Aristotle would call not κίνησις but ἐνέργεια, the activity 
of intellection.22 Indeed, in the many passages throughout the dialogues in 
which Plato insists on the changelessness of intelligible being (Phaedo 78d1-7, 
79d2, 80b1-2; Phaedrus 247d7-e2; Symposium 211a1-b5; Republic 479a1-3, e7-8, 
484b4, 585c1-2; Parmenides 135c1; Timaeus 27d6-28a2, 29a7, 52a1-3) he never, 
with one exception, refers to it as “immovable.” Timaeus 38a3 is the exception 
that proves the rule: here Plato describes eternal being as ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον 
ἀκινήτως. But the context here is the distinction between eternity and time, so 
20 Cf. the less literal but still accurate translation in Duerlinger (2009) 113: “But like children 
who request [both when offered a choice of two things], he must say that being and all 
things are both [at rest and in motion]” (brackets in original). Contrast Ross (1951) 110: 
“And when [Plato] says that to the question whether reality is changeable or unchange-
able we must answer ‘it is both’, he does not mean that the same reality in some mysteri-
ous way manages to be both, but that both unchanging Ideas and changing minds are 
perfectly real.” This, quite simply (as Ross here admits), is not what the text says.
21 Crombie (1962) 419-20, recognizes that it is the same things that are both “changeless” and 
“changeable,” in different ways.
22 On this terminological difference between Plato and Aristotle see Gerson (2006) 297-8 
and Gerson (2004) 41 n. 60, 217.
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that in this particular case κίνησις unmistakably refers specifically to temporal 
change rather than to activity in general. In the Laws, Plato expressly discusses 
the “motion of intellect” (κίνησις νοῦ, 897d3), and represents this motion by the 
image of a sphere rotating in a fixed location. This image perfectly captures 
the non-contradictory coinciding of motion and rest: the entire sphere is both 
completely in motion and completely immobile, in different respects.23 The 
“motion of intellect,” then, is in no way incompatible with the changelessness 
of intelligible being. The children’s prayer is granted.
If the argument in the Sophist were the only place in the corpus where 
Plato even seems to attribute intellect, life, and motion to intelligible being, 
this interpretation, despite its close adherence to the exact wording of the 
text, would perhaps remain speculative.24 What renders it truly compelling is 
that this passage is not isolated, and does not represent a change in Plato’s 
thought,25 but rather agrees with the relation between thought and being that 
we find throughout the dialogues: in the myth of recollection, in the gastro-
nomic and conjugal metaphors for knowledge, in the relation of craftsman and 
paradigm, in the “intelligible living thing” of the Timaeus, and in the “motion 
of intellect” in the Laws.26 On the contrary, it is the caricature of the forms 
as lifeless objects extrinsic to the thought that knows them that has no real 
basis anywhere in the dialogues. The recognition that the forms are insepara-
bly united with living intelligence not only in the Sophist, or even in the Sophist 
along with other supposedly “late” dialogues such as the Timaeus and the Laws, 
but also in the Meno, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Symposium, and Republic, lends strong 
support to the unitarian as opposed to the developmental reading of Plato.27 
23 Gerson (2006) 298 refers to this passage in the Laws but does not remark on the image of 
the rotating sphere, which strongly supports his interpretation.
24 Thus, e.g., Cornford (1935) 245, argues that since “[t]he Forms are never represented as 
living and thinking beings,” therefore this cannot be Plato’s meaning here. In addition to 
being circular, this disregards the references in the Timaeus to “the intelligible living 
thing.”
25 Thus Crombie (1962) 419, remarks, “There is nothing in this conclusion which reads like a 
recantation of anything that Plato has ever written,” and again, 420, “[T]here is no reason 
to say that [Plato] is here repenting of the belief in unchanging forms in the only sense of 
‘unchanging’ to which he had ever intended to commit himself.”
26 On the identity of “the complete living thing” (παντελὲς ζῷον) of the Timaeus with “that 
which completely is” (τὸ παντελῶς ὄν) of the Sophist, see Ferrari (2011). 
27 Here we must differ with Vogel (1986), who finds the Plotinian doctrine in the Sophist and 
the Timaeus but remarks (194) that in the Phaedo, Symposium, Republic, and Phaedrus, 
“not a trace” of it can be found. Gerson is less explicit on this point, saying (2006) 291 n. 2, 
“I refrain from exploration of the developmentalist vs. unitarian conceptions of Plato’s 
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The conjugal unity of intellectual activity and intelligible being is Plato’s uni-
form and consistent understanding of the relation between intellect and the 
forms. This reading of Plato thus takes down, at one stroke, three main pil-
lars of modern Plato interpretation: the lifelessness of the forms, the “ocular” 
model of knowledge, and, at least in this important instance, the chronological 
development of Plato’s thought.
Plato concludes the Timaeus with these words: “Having received and been 
filled with mortal and immortal living things, thus this cosmos, a visible living 
thing containing visible ones, image of the intelligible, a sensible god, greatest, 
best, most beautiful, and most perfect, has come to be, this which is the one 
only-begotten universe” (92c5-9). The expression “image of the intelligible” is 
provocatively ambiguous. Does it mean “of that which is intelligible, the intelli-
gible in general”? Or “of the intelligible living thing,” implied by antithesis with 
“visible living thing”? Or “of the intelligible god,” implied by antithesis with 
“sensible god”? The ambiguity is no doubt deliberate, and there is no need to 
choose among these alternatives. The intelligible in general, intelligible being 
as a whole, is itself the intelligible living thing, as the content of intellect which 
is the intelligible god. This, intellect and the intelligible in their togetherness, is 
the living, divine reality of which the sensible world is an image.
4 Aristotle and Plotinus
Aristotle’s understanding of the unity of intellect and the intelligible is thus not 
opposed to but in continuity with Plato’s thought.28 In apprehending the intel-
ligible, intellect has it as its content and so is the intelligible. “The intellect is in 
a way potentially the intelligible, but in actuality nothing before it thinks . . . For 
in the case of things without matter, the thinking and that which is thought are 
the same [τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον]; for  contemplative knowledge 
philosophy,” but implies in the same note both that he accepts the assumption that the 
Phaedo is earlier than the Sophist and that the doctrine of the latter is not to be found in 
the former. 
28 Owens (1978) 458, contrasts Plato and Aristotle thus: “[T]he Platonic forms are potential. 
They are knowables. The Aristotelian separate forms are knowings. If the terms ‘intelligi-
bles’ and ‘intelligences’ may be used for the moment to translate these notions, the 
Platonic forms are merely intelligibles; the Aristotelian forms are intelligences . . . While 
the Platonic form is something as it were flat and essentially a knowable, the Aristotelian 
is vital and in comparison three-dimensioned . . .” (italics in original). Evidently Owens 
altogether disregards the passage in the Sophist which derides precisely this view of 
Plato’s forms and expressly attributes activity, life, and intelligence to the intelligible. 
156 perl
The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 8 (�0�4) �35-�60
and that which is known in this way are the same” (On the Soul Γ.4, 429b30-
430a5). The human intellect is only “potentially the intelligible,” and becomes 
the intelligible, becomes what it knows, in being actualized. The unmoved 
mover, on the other hand, as pure actuality, is always already both intellect and 
the intelligible. “Thought thinks itself by participation in the intelligible; for it 
becomes intelligible in touching and thinking, so that intellect and the intel-
ligible are the same; for intellect is what is receptive of the intelligible, that is, 
of reality [τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας], and it is in act in possessing” (Metaphysics 
Λ.7, 1072b20-23). Here Aristotle adopts both Plato’s metaphor of “touching” for 
intellectual apprehension and Plato’s equation of the intelligible, τοῦ νοητοῦ, 
with reality, τῆς οὐσίας. As such apprehension, the unmoved mover, like Plato’s 
demiurge, is one with purely intelligible reality: “In some cases the knowl-
edge is the thing . . . Since, then, that which is thought and the intellect [τοῦ 
νοουμένου καὶ τοῦ νοῦ] are not different with regard to things that do not have 
matter, they will be the same, and the thinking [ἡ νόησις] will be one with that 
which is thought [τῷ νοουμένῳ]” (Metaphysics Λ.9, 1075a1-5).29 Just as pure form 
or actuality, Aristotle’s god, like Plato’s demiurge, is both act-of-thinking and 
content of thought, and as such, while changeless, is not inert or lifeless but, 
on the contrary, is life itself: “For the activity of intellect is life, and he is that 
activity” (Metaphysics Λ.7, 1072b27).
It is in just this sense that the unmoved mover is “thought thinking itself” 
or “the thinking of thinking” (Metaphysics Λ.9, 1074b34-35). This should not 
be taken to mean that divine thinking is “empty,” devoid of content.30 On the 
contrary, Aristotle specifically insists that it must have content: “If it thinks 
nothing, what would be its dignity?” (Metaphysics Λ.9, 1074b18). His point in 
insisting that the unmoved mover thinks only himself is not that he thinks 
nothing, but that what he thinks is not extrinsic to himself.31 As Aristotle 
observes, the notion that if the divine thinking thinks only itself then it is 
empty erroneously applies the model of sense-perception to thinking, presup-
posing that what is thought must be extrinsic to the thinking just as what is 
sensed is extrinsic to the sensing: “But it appears that knowledge and sensation 
29 In Aristotle as in Plato, it is inappropriate to translate νοούμενον as “object of thought.” 
Indeed, if ‘object’ is taken to mean “that which stands over against,” then it is almost the 
exact opposite of what Aristotle means, since his fundamental point is that that which is 
thought or known is not over against but is rather one with the thinking or knowing.
30 Cf. Owens (1978) 458-59 n. 23: “Matter as such has no intelligible content whatsoever. The 
whole ‘content’ is the form. It is therefore meaningless to ask what the Aristotelian ‘self-
thinking’ is about, on the ground that it is deprived of sensible reference.”
31 Cf. Gerson (2004) 198.
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and opinion and understanding are always of another, and of itself only as a by-
product . . . For it is not the same to be an act-of-thinking and to be that which 
is thought” (Metaphysics Λ.9, 1074b36-75a1) This is not Aristotle’s own position, 
but an objection to which he will reply: “Rather, in some cases the knowledge 
is the thing.” In what cases? Again, “Since, then, that which is thought and the 
intellect [τοῦ νοουμένου καὶ τοῦ νοῦ] are not different with regard to things that 
do not have matter, they will be the same, and the thinking [ἡ νόησις] will be 
one with that which is thought [τῷ νοουμένῳ]” (Metaphysics Λ.9, 1075a1-5). In 
the case of sensible things, matter is the difference, the element of externality, 
between cognition and that which is cognized. But where the latter is nothing 
but form, there is no such externality. To say that the divine thinking thinks 
itself, therefore, is to say that it is the thinking, not of nothing, but of intelligi-
ble reality, form without matter. Since the unmoved mover is knowledge itself, 
he is one with the formal, intelligible content of the world without matter, and 
this is what he knows in knowing himself.32 As in Plato, intelligible reality is 
not apart from but is the content of the activity of intellectual apprehension, 
which is what the unmoved mover is.
In arguing for the unity of intellect and the intelligible, therefore, Plotinus 
is not innovating but is following the thought of both Plato and Aristotle. To 
be sure, unlike Aristotle, Plotinus argues at length that this unity cannot be a 
simple or absolute identity. Within the “one nature” (V.5.3.1) which is at once 
intellect and being, Plotinus finds it necessary to distinguish, although never 
to separate, intellect as act and being as content. This follows from Plotinus’ 
recognition of the intentionality of thinking: “Every intellection is from some-
thing and of something” (VI.7.40.6). Hence there must be an otherness as well 
as a togetherness between intellect and that which it thinks, even if the latter 
is its own content and in that sense itself: “Its intellection about itself must 
32 Cf. Kahn (1985) 326: “Essences considered apart from matter are ungenerated and imper-
ishable . . . Taken as immaterial and delineated by their universal definition, such essences 
are fully intelligible (noēta) . . . They also, on my reading of Λ 9, provide the content for the 
noetic act of the divine Intellect.” Kahn adds, 327 n. 24, “The more completely a human 
being engages in noetic contemplation, the more fully he grasps the formal structure of 
the cosmos. If the divine represents the goal to which human thought at its best aspires, 
surely the divine must grasp the whole of this structure rather than none of it! . . . Reflexion 
must be reflexion on something which is not itself reflexion . . . Hence nous is determined 
or defined by the essences which are its objects . . . The counter-objection, that the divine 
mind would be less perfect if it knew anything other than itself, is spurious, just because 
in actual noēsis the knowing subject is identical with its object. Drastically put, the Prime 
Mover is simply the formal-noetic structure of the cosmos as conscious of itself ” (italics in 
original).
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be of something different, if it is to be able to think itself as anything at all” 
(VI.7.39.12-13). Without this otherness, there would be no intentionality, no 
apprehending of anything, and hence neither intellect nor the intelligible. “But 
if intellect, intellection, intelligible are the same, by becoming altogether one 
[πάντη ἓν] they will make themselves disappear in themselves” (VI.7.41.12-13). 
Apprehension is a single occurrence which, necessarily, can be analyzed into 
the apprehending and the apprehended, the knowing and the known. It takes 
two to “be together.” Intellect as act-of-thinking and being as that-which-is-
thought must coincide, but ‘intellect’ and ‘being’ do not have the same mean-
ing. The first signifies act and the second content, two inseparable moments 
(not parts) of a single reality. “That which thinks, then, when it thinks, must be 
in two, either one outside the other or both in the same; and by necessity think-
ing is always in otherness and in sameness, and the things that are properly 
thought are both the same and different in relation to intellect” (V.3.10.23-26). 
Hence, “in that it thinks it is two and in that it thinks itself, one” (V.6.1.23). For 
this reason, Plotinus argues, against Aristotle, that this “one nature” cannot be 
the first principle. But this difference between Plotinus and Aristotle not only 
occurs within, but depends on, their underlying continuity with regard to the 
necessary togetherness of intellect and the intelligible. It is from this starting-
point, which Plotinus shares with both Plato and Aristotle, that he argues that 
thinking and being must be distinct in order to be united, and hence cannot 
be unqualifiedly first.
In V.9, after giving arguments for the unity of intellect and being, Plotinus 
cites as testimonies to this doctrine not only Parmenides, “Thinking and being 
are the same” (DK B 3), but also Aristotle, “The knowledge of things without 
matter is the same as the thing” (On the Soul Γ.4, 430a3) and Plato, “the recollec-
tions” (V.9.5.29-32). This shows, incidentally, that Plotinus understands Plato’s 
myth of recollection as we have interpreted it here, as an expression of the 
internality of the intelligibles to the act of intellection. This catalogue of testi-
monies is no mere collection of proof-texts having no real bearing on the issue 
at hand, but, on the contrary, reveals Plotinus’ profound understanding of the 
philosophical tradition to which his doctrine belongs.
The Neoplatonic principle that intelligible being is one with living intelli-
gence is thus fully continuous with both Plato’s and Aristotle’s understandings 
of the relation between intellect and the intelligible and of the nature of purely 
intelligible, divine reality. This recognition contributes to a salutary “paradigm 
shift” that is currently taking place in the study of ancient philosophy. For too 
long, the standard, “textbook” account has set Aristotle in opposition to Plato, 
and dismissed Neoplatonism as a marginal or even aberrant development. 
Instead, with regard to this doctrine as well as many others, we are now com-
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ing to see a continuous line of thought leading from Plato through Aristotle 
to Plotinus and the Neoplatonists. This change in perspective not only offers 
a more authentic understanding of Aristotle in his relation to Plato, but also 
enables us to see Neoplatonism not as a bizarre offshoot but as the main trunk 
of the classical tradition, and indeed as its fullest flowering.
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